To the contrary, it gives effect to them.” Belleville relied upon a 1980 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Greenwood Shopping Plaza.
It said that that decision precluded the Browns from relying on the 1953 agreement to which they were not a party.
In that sense, the Browns did not have to demonstrate the application of the “third party beneficiary rule”.
They were effectively parties as much as the original party.
The municipality, the Town of Belleville, defended the action on a number of grounds.
It said that the limitation period had expired because the Browns or their predecessors had long ago accepted the municipalities’ repudiation of contract.Most commercial agreements contain a clause stating that the contract is binding upon and for the benefit of “successors.” For example, Article 10.1 of the CCDC Cost Plus Contract states that the contract “shall enure to the benefit of and be binding on…successors”. Recently, the Ontario Court of Appeal considered this issue in Brown v. Factual Background Let’s remind ourselves of the facts in Brown v. In 1953, a municipality signed an agreement with a farmer under which the municipality agreed to maintain and repair a storm sewer drainage system that it had constructed on and near the farmer’s lands. Do those who enter into the contract know who the successors are? In that article I was concerned with whether inaction could amount to acceptance of a repudiation of a contract.The language of the enurement clause unequivocally confirms that the contracting parties intended and agreed that the benefit of the Agreement would extend to an aggregation or class of persons that includes successor landowner of Mr. On the admitted findings of the motion judge, the Browns are Mr. In this sense, the Browns are not strangers or ‘third parties’ to the Agreement.Rather, …given the intention of the contracting parties stipulated in the Agreement under the enurement clause, I conclude that ‘relaxing’ the doctrine of privity in this case does not frustrate the reasonable expectations of the parties at the time the Agreement was formed.If the main contract between the owner and the contractor states that it is binding on the “successors” of the contractor, does that word include a subcontractor?What if the owner has given a covenant in the main contract that affects the electrical work and the contractor subcontracts the entire electrical work to an electrical subcontractor?If the contact has an enurement clause in favour of or binding on successors, then successors are parties to the contract as much as the original parties. But what about a tenant, or subtenant, of that later owner?If that tenant has exclusive possession of the affected property, and is the person who is really affected by a breach of the agreement, is that person a successor?Nonetheless, it is my view that the Browns’ status as the successors of the original covenantee under the Agreement affords them the right to seek to enforce the original covenantor’s contractual obligations, as against the original covenantor. Sills’s successors, the Browns stood ready to comply with the activity required of them under the Agreement- the provision of access to their lands.In all these circumstances, the application of the principled exception to the privity rule advances the interests of justice.” (emphasis added Analysis The Brown v.